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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 1042
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3276
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7701
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA IMMEDIATE 6539
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA IMMEDIATE 8878
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE IMMEDIATE 0354
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO IMMEDIATE 7056
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RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 002197

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV JA PINR KS KN
SUBJECT: EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY KURT CAMPBELL'S MEETING
WITH MOFA DG AKITAKA SAIKI

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Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James P. Zumwalt, Reasons 1.4 (b)
) and (d)

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary of State (A/S) for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell met with Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Director General (DG) of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Akitaka Saiki at the latter's Tokyo office on September 18. DG Saiki praised MOFA's new leader, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, but warned that the new administration's threat to tame the Japanese bureaucracy would end in failure. A/S Campbell and DG Saiki discussed former President Bill Clinton's mission to Pyongyang to free two U.S. journalists, the current situation regarding the Six Party Talks, the unresolved issue of North Korea's abduction of Japanese citizens, and the humanitarian situation in North Korea. Saiki said he was disappointed in regional architecture initiatives such as ASEAN and did not understand why China decided not to participate in a U.S.-Japan-PRC trilateral, but was optimistic about an upcoming trilateral summit involving Japan, South Korea, and China. Saiki concluded by speaking about U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK relations under the new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led government. END SUMMARY.

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The New Administration and the Bureaucracy
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¶2. (C) Speaking about the new DPJ government, DG Saiki said he was glad to have Katsuya Okada heading the Foreign Ministry, as he is ""very intellectual"" and ""understands the issues." " Saiki explained that Okada did not pose any problems in his areas of responsibility--North Korea, South Korea, and China. Although some bureaucrats were worried about the DPJ government's threat to diminish their power, Saiki warned that if the DPJ tried to crush the pride of professional bureaucrats, it would not succeed.

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Six Party Talks
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¶ 3. (S) Saiki expressed his appreciation for USG cooperation and close consultation related to North Korean issues. The DG mentioned that he had confirmed with Foreign Minister Okada that UN sanctions on the DPRK should be maintained. Saiki spoke about China's nervousness about the North's recent behavior, its desire to avoid seeing instability or collapse in the neighboring country, and its continuing preference to see a divided Korean peninsula that provided a geopolitical buffer. He then talked about the DPRK's dislike for the Six Party Talks (so much as to insist on avoiding the word ""six"" and instead calling it ""multilateral"" talks) and concluded that whether or not the North Koreans return to the table would depend on U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks. Saiki relayed that when he asked the North whether they preferred to have one of the six parties removed from the framework, the answer was no. A cosmetic change such as the addition of Mongolia, which had expressed an interest in joining the Six Party process, may be a possible way out of the current stalemate, Saiki conjectured.

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Abductions Issue
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¶ 4. (S) Saiki lamented that the DPRK believes that 2002 was ""a mistake""--referring to when North Korea admitted that it had abducted Japanese citizens. The DG xxxxxxxxxxxx explained that the fate of Megumi Yokota was the biggest issue, since she was still relatively young (in her forties) and the public was most sympathetic to her case. xxxxxxxxxxxx Saiki was

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concerned that the new minister in charge of abductions, Hiroshi Nakai, was a hardliner. Saiki concluded by saying the Japanese needed to sit down with the North Koreans to decide how to make progress on the abductions issue, and that the new Japanese government would be just as attentive as the Liberal Democratic Party was to the problem.

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Humanitarian Issues
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¶ 5. (C) With a harvest coming up in one month, the North faced a fertilizer problem and a drastic decrease in food production, said Saiki. As a result, the black market was very active. In this context and because of the effects of UN Resolution 1874, DPRK leaders were only concerned with themselves, according to Saiki.

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Regional Architecture
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¶ 6. (S) Saiki confessed that he was ""very disappointed"" with initiatives such as ASEAN and ARF, where leaders tend to talk about the same topics using the same talking points. Despite the frustration stemming from the need to form a consensus on all decisions between ten countries with ""unequal economies,"" Saiki stated that ""we must continue"" and cannot allow China to dominate in Southeast Asia. At the same time, Saiki admitted that ASEAN countries were calculating in their own ways, and often played Japan and China against each other. Saiki said that Indonesia was Japan's most reliable partner in ASEAN.

¶ 7. (C) He spoke more optimistically about the trilateral summit planned for October 10 between Japan, China, and South Korea. Saiki said that Japan wanted China to be more responsible and transparent and hoped the upcoming trilateral would help nudge it in that direction.

¶ 8. (C) On the possible trilateral dialogue between the U.S., Japan, and China, Saiki wondered why the Chinese had changed their minds and cancelled their participation at the

last minute. Campbell replied that despite the USG's best efforts to confirm Chinese participation, we received no reply from China.

U.S.-Japan Relations Under the DPJ Government

¶9. (S) Regarding DPJ leaders' call for an ""equal relationship"" with the U.S., Saiki confessed that he did not know what was on the minds of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and FM Okada, as the bilateral relationship was already equal. Saiki theorized that the DPJ, as an inexperienced ruling party, felt the need to project an image of power and confidence by showing it had Japan's powerful bureaucrats under control and was in charge of a new and bold foreign policy that challenged the U.S. Saiki called this way of thinking ""stupid"" and said ""they will learn."""

Japan-ROK Relations

¶10. (C) Saiki said the Lee Myung-bak government in South Korea was good for Japan because it was forward-looking. He pointed out that 2010 was a critical year for the two nations because it marked the centennial anniversary of the Japanese annexation of Korea. Saiki stated that historical issues such as Takeshima-Dokdo may cause tension between Japan and the ROK in the near future, with guidelines for teachers regarding high school textbooks scheduled to be revised, and

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recommended that the U.S. not get involved. On the other hand, ROK President Lee Myung-bak's strong desire to have Hatoyama visit Seoul on or around the date of the trilateral summit between Japan, South Korea, and China, may strengthen bilateral relations between the neighboring countries. Saiki continued that the Foreign Minister supported such a visit, but there was no reply as of yet from the Prime Minister's Office.

¶11. (U) Participants:

DG Saiki
Director Tarumi (Chinese and Mongolian Affairs)
Director Shimada (Northeast Asian Affairs)

A/S Campbell
DOD PDAS Derek Mitchell
DCM Jim Zumwalt
Japan Desk Director Kevin Maher
Tokyo POL M/C Rob Luke
Special Assistant Mark Tesone
Tokyo POL Andrew Ou (notetaker)

¶12. (C) This cable has been cleared by Assistant Secretary Campbell.
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